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ARTICLE 
THE PRESIDIO TRUST AND OUR 
NATIONAL PARKS: NOT A MODEL 
TO BE TRUSTED 
BY JOHANNA H. W ALD* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Presidio is unique. As a large area of natural habitat in 
a congested urban landscape, as a site which retains centuries 
of historic and prehistoric artifacts, as the longest continually 
operating military base in the United States, and as the south-
ern promontory of the Golden Gate Bridge, one of the world's 
most recognized vistas, the Presidio is without equal. 
Also unique are the politics which led to the terms under 
which this national park is now being managed. The l04th 
Congress, and particularly its leadership, mounted an un-
precedented assault on America's public lands, including our 
national parks. Those leaders called for no less than eliminat-
* Johanna Wald is a Senior Attorney and Director of the Land Program in the 
San Francisco office of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). The holder of 
a law degree from Yale University, Ms. Wald has been with NRDC for 25 years, during 
which time she has become an expert on federal land and resource management issues, 
brought major litigation involving the federal coal leasing and range management 
programs, and authored a variety of publications. She and others at NRDC were in-
volved in the effort to enact Presidio Trust legislation as well as in the other legislative 
battles described in this article. Ms. Wald thanks Brian Huse, Pacific Regional Direc-
tor of the National Parks and Conservation Association (NPCA), for his invaluable 
assistance in the writing of this article as well as in the legislative battles it describes. 
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ing parks and ending federal ownership and control of vast ar-
eas of the public estate. While unsuccessful in this frontal at-
tack, they did succeed in inserting elements of their agenda 
into otherwise positive or innocuous legislation. The Presidio 
Trust bill, the topic of this article, came nowhere near accom-
plishing what those leaders hoped to accomplish. Yet a close 
analysis reveals troubling provisions heretofore unthinkable 
for management of our national parks. In sum, while the Pre-
sidio Trust legislation could have been worse, it needs to be 
improved for the sake of the Presidio and cannot be viewed as a 
model for the management of other parks. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM AND 
WHY THE PRESIDIO IS UNIQUE 
The idea of national parks is a uniquely American concept, 
ranking with our democratic form of government and the Bill of 
Rights as one of the best ideas our country has ever had. Since 
the establishment of Yellowstone National Park in 1872, the 
National Park System has evolved and been systematically ex-
panded to accommodate our desire to preserve the natural, cul-
tural, and historic treasures which define our landscape and 
identify us as a nation.1 Today, there are a total of 375 parks of 
various different types and different designations or titles 
within the park system.2 The Presidio stands out among them 
all: not only does it have outstanding natural, cultural, and 
historic values, it also could justifiably bear numerous different 
designations. 
After setting aside Yellowstone, the United States began 
preserving large tracts of western federal lands as either na-
tional parks or national monuments. In general, national 
parks, such as Yosemite and Sequoia in California, and Glacier 
in Montana, set aside an array of resources within boundaries 
1. For an overview of the history of the National Park System, see, e.g., DYAN 
ZAsLOWSKY, THESE AMERICAN LANDS: PARKS, WILDERNESS, AND THE PUBUC LANDS 
(Island Press 1994). 
2. See SHARON BUCCINO, ET AL, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL AND 
NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, RECLAIMING OUR HERITAGE: WHAT WE 
NEED TO DO TO PRESERVE AMERICA'S NATIONAL PARKS 2 (1997). 
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that are hopefully large enough to provide them adequate pro-
tection.3 Monuments, on the other hand, usually protect a sin-
gle, nationally significant resource, whether natural or cul-
tural. Broadly speaking, monuments are smaller than national 
parks and focus the visitor's attention on the particular feature 
being preserved. The towering columns of basaltic rock at 
Devil's Postpile in California's Sierra Nevada mountains and 
the rich fossils beds at Dinosaur on the border between Colo-
rado and Utah are among the nation's seventy-four national 
monuments. The newest of our monuments - Grand Staircase-
Escalante in Utah - was established in September 1996, by 
President Clinton.4 Other types of units which preserve natu-
ral resources and are under the jurisdiction of the National 
Park Service include national preserves, national lakeshores 
and seashores, national wild and scenic rivers, and national 
scenic trails.5 
Early on, national parks and the western monuments were 
administered by the Department of the Interior.6 Other na-
tional monuments, historic sites, and protected lands, however, 
were administered by the War Department and the U.S. Forest 
Service. A 1933 Executive Order transferred sixty-three of 
these other sites to the jurisdiction. of the National Park Serv-
ice as a means of providing more efficient and consistent pro-
tection.7 This consolidation created a true system of parks pro-
tecting both natural and historic resources under a single 
agency with a single management mandate. 
3. In fact, however, many existing parks are not large enough. Our oldest and 
largest national park, Yellowstone, is not large enough to support viable populations of 
many of its wildlife species. See T. W. Clark & D. Zaunbrecher, The Greater Yellow· 
stone Ecosystem: The Ecosystem Concept in Natural Resource Policy and Management, 
5 RENEWABLE RESOURCES JOURNAL 8·16 (1987). 
4. See THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, ESTABLISHMENT OF 
THE GRAND STAIRCASE-ESCALANTE NATIONAL MONUMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES (September 18, 1996). 
5. See BUCCINO, supra note 2, at 2. 
6. The National Park Service was created in the Department of the Interior in 
1916, and given responsibility for protecting America's national parks and monuments. 
See National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq (1994). 
7. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK INDEX, GPO: 1995 . 
387·035f20001, at 7. 
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Of course, the decision to preserve a wider array of re-
sources as national parks led to the creation not only of more 
kinds of parks, but also of more designations for them. Today 
more than half of the units in the park system protect locations 
and celebrate persons and events important to the Nation's 
history. From the interpretation of the 2,000 year old artifacts 
and archeological sites of Ohio's Hopewell Culture National 
Historical Park, to the protection of our nation's birthplace, 
Independence Hall in Philadelphia, to the memorialization of 
the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II at 
Manzanar National Historic Site in California, units of the Na-
tional Park System protect important elements of America's 
history and pre-history. In addition to national historical 
parks and national historic sites, our Revolutionary and Civil 
War history is preserved under such designations as national 
military parks and national battlefield parks. 
Still other areas and their resources are protected under the 
relatively new designation of National Recreation Area. Origi-
nally this designation was applied to parks adjacent to or sur-
rounding man-made reservoirs. Now these areas include other 
lands set aside by Congress for recreational purposes, the most 
significant of which are urban recreation areas such as the 
Golden Gate and Santa Monica Mountains National Recreation 
Areas. These important parks not only protect nationally sig-
nificant resources, they also provide a national park experience 
for many people who are unable to travel farther than the edge 
of the city and would otherwise never have such an experience. 
In general, each of the 375 units of the National Park Sys-
tem concentrates on a particular ecosystem, natural or historic 
landmark, or a particular period in time as indicated by its 
particular name or designation. Unlike most park units, how-
ever, the Presidio does not have a specific designation: it is ac-
tually "only" a part of the Golden Gate National Recreation 
Area ("GGNRA").8 What is more, unlike virtually all other 
parks, it could rightly exist on its own as anyone of several 
8. See Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-333, 110 Stat. 4093, 16 U.S.C. § 460bb note (1996), Title I - The Presidio of San 
Francisco, § 101(4) and (5). 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol28/iss3/5
1998] PRESIDIO TRUST AND NATIONAL PARKS 373 
designations - as a national park, a national monument, a na-
tional historic park, or a national military park. 
From a military perspective, the Presidio is truly unique. In 
no other park can one fmd the depth and breadth of military 
history that is present in the Presidio. In continuous operation 
from 1776 until it was transferred to the National Park Service 
on October 1, 1994,9 the Presidio retains archeological sites, 
artifacts, and structures from its occupation by the nations of 
Spain, Mexico, and the United States. Moreover, the Presidio 
has played a role in every major war fought by the United 
States and has even helped to protect parks as well. During 
the early 1900's, Buffalo Soldiers, billeted in the Presidio, 
regularly rode out to patrol Yosemite, Sequoia and General 
Grant National Parks.10 The architecture of the Presidio re-
flects every major construction period of U.S. military history 
since 1848.11 
Yet, the Presidio's historical significance is not limited to 
the martial. Within its borders are archeological sites that 
predate European settlement of the area and offer a glimpse 
into the lives of the native OhIone people.12 Some 550 build-
ings within its borders are on the National Register of Historic 
Places and "contribute to the national landmark designation 
for the entire Presidio."13 It was at Crissy Field on the north-
ern shore of the Presidio that military aviation on the west 
coast was established.14 The Presidio served as a refugee cen-
ter following the devastating 1906 San Francisco earthquake, 
and then hosted part of the 1915 Panama-Pacific International 
Exposition that celebrated the city's rebirth.15 
9. See H.R. REP. No. 104-234, at 6 (1995). 
10. See NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, FINAL GENERAL MANAGEMENT PLAN 
AMENDMENT, PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, GoLDEN GATE NATIONAL RECREATION 
AREA, CALIFORNlA 8 (1994) [hereinafter, "NPS, FINAL PRESIDIO GENERAL PLAN 
AMENDMENT"J. General Grant National Park, established in 1890, was expanded and 
renamed Kings Canyon National Park in 1940. 
11. See id. at 7. 
12. See id. at 8. 
13. H.R. REP. No. 104-234, at 6 (1995). 
14. See NPS FINAL PRESIDIO GENERAL PLAN AMENDMENT, supra note 10, at 8. 
15. See id. 
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The Presidio also easily fits the designation of national 
monument. As a national historic landmark16 sitting on one of 
the world's most photographed promontories at the foot of the 
Golden Gate Bridge, the site is one of a kind. Finally, as a na-
tional park, the Presidio would still be without peer. Perhaps 
small for a national park, the site contains a variety of re-
sources not found in areas 100 times its sizeP 
On the edge of an urban area with a population of five mil-
lion people, the Presidio stands in stark contrast to the con-
gested landscape around it. Some 220 years of military occupa-
tion have resulted in the retention of astounding natural fea-
tures and rich biodiversity. Lobos Creek, which runs along and 
within the Presidio's southern border, is San Francisco's only 
remaining free-flowing above-ground stream and supports na-
tive riparian habitat. IS In all, ten native plant communities 
can be found on the Presidio, including wetlands, grasslands, 
and sand dunes.19 The Army's historic forest provides not only 
a stunning cultural landscape, but also habitat for neotropical 
migrant songbirds and state and federally listed endangered 
plant species.2o The Presidio also harbors miles of hiking 
trails, tennis courts, and a golf course21 and receives a high 
volume of visitors on its own as well as as part of the GGNRA, 
which is the second most visited of our parks nationwide.22 
The Presidio is indeed unique. In addition to its outstand-
ing natural, cultural and historic resources, the Presidio has 
3.5 million square feet of useable building space. In fact, the 
former base is a small city, complete with water, sewer, elec-
tricity, and telephone systems. Unlike other national parks, 
where use of resources is forbidden or closely controlled, the 
16. See id. at 7. 
17. NATIONAL PARKS AND CONSERVATION AsSOCIATION, FACT SHEET: PROTECTING 
THE SAN FRANCISCO PRESIDIO (1995) !hereinafter "NPCA, PRESIDIO FACT SHEET"J. 
18. See id. at 9. 
19. See id. 
20. See PETE HOLLORAN, SEEING THE TREES THROUGH THE FOREST: OAKS AND 
HISTORY ON THE PRESIDIO (City Lights 1997). 
21. See id. 
22. See BUCCINO, supra note 2, at App. 1, 84-92. 
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Presidio's historic buildings must be used. Empty buildings 
fall apart. 
Occupied buildings can be better maintained and protected, 
thus extending their lives.23 The simplest and most cost effec-
tive way to preserve the Presidio's buildings - which numbered 
approximately 870 at the time the Trust legislation was en-
acted24 - is by renting them and reinvesting the rents in main-
tenance. 
The Park Service, however, is not a real estate agency and 
lacks the expertise needed to manage and rent these buildings 
or to finance and supervise the rehabilitation that many of 
them need.25 This fact, together with the sheer magnitude of 
the property management task at the Presidio, provided the 
original impetus for the notion of creating a new entity to work 
with the Park Service to carry out this task.26 That notion and 
early legislative proposals to accomplish it;27 were drastically 
different than the final Trust legislation, thanks to the leaders 
ofthe 104th Congress and their anti-environmental agenda. 
III. THE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA OF THE 104TH 
CONGRESS: LIQUIDATING THE FEDERAL ESTATE 
The legislation creating the Presidio Trust was enacted on 
the last day of the 104th Congress as part of an omnibus parks 
bill that, among other things, also created the Tallgrass Prairie 
National Park and provided protection for Sterling Forest on 
23. See, e.g., NPCA, PRESIDIO FACT SHEET, supra note 17. 
24. See H.R. REP. No. 104-234, at 6 (1995). 
25. The Park Service has estimated that it would take $590 million in capitol im-
provements to restore the Presidio's historic buildings and remove the non-historic 
ones. See NPS, FINAL PRESIDIO GENERAL PLAN AMENDMENT, supra note 10, at 141. It 
has also conceded that it lacks the necessary expertise. See id. at 112. 
26. See, e.g., NPS, FINAL PRESIDIO GENERAL PLAN AMENDMENT, supra note 10, at 
21-22, 114. See also S. 1639, 103rd Cong., (1993); H.R. 3433, 103d Cong., (1993). 
27. See, e.g., H.R. 3433, 103rd Congo (1993) and S. 1639, 103d Cong., (1993), both 
of which would have created a corporation, the Presidio Corporation, within the De-
partment of the Interior to manage the leasing, maintenance, rehabilitation, repair and 
improvement of specified properties located at the Presidio. 
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the New YorklNew Jersey border.28 That the legislation also 
included controversial provisions and specifically provisions of 
the Trust bill is hardly surprising. The l04th Congress saw a 
frontal assault on America's federal lands, led by westerners in 
the House, under the pretext of deficit reduction and govern-
ment efficiency. The overall aim of this assault was nothing 
less than the dismantling of the public estate, by transferring 
as many as possible of our public lands to the states and pri-
vate interests.29 Far more ambitious than the "privatization" 
scheme of the Reagan era, which sought to sell off "only" about 
five percent of the public's lands in total,30 bills in the l04th 
Congress sought to put hundreds of millions of acres on the 
block. These bills formed the backdrop against which the Pre-
sidio Trust legislation was debated and ultimately enacted and 
against which the legislation must be judged. 
The l04th Congress saw an unprecedented attack on 
America's public lands. To achieve the goal of dismantling the 
federal estate, members introduced a variety of legislative pro-
posals including bills to (1) sell the public lands outright to pri-
vate interests; (2) give them away - typically to the states in 
which they were located; and (3) prevent federal managers 
from carrying out their management responsibilities through 
either the budget process or the more traditional legislative 
process.3t Parks were not immune from these attacks; in fact, 
as discussed below, anti-public land forces in the Congress 
tried to pass legislation to liquidate the National Park System. 
A. SELLING PUBLIC LANDS 
Prior to the l04th Congress and following passage of the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law, Congressional budget rules ex-
pressly prohibited the sale of federal assets to be "scored" - ie., 
28. See Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996, Title 10, Sub-
titles A and B. 
29. See JOHANNA H. WALD & S. YASSA, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, 
SELLING OUR HERITAGE - CONGRESSIONAL PLANs FOR AMERICA'S PUBLIC LANDS (1995). 
30. See, e.g., Johanna H. Wald & Elizabeth H. Temkin, The Sagebrush Rebellion: 
The West Against Itself - Again, 2 J. ENVTL L. 187 (1982) (citing Budget Contains Pro· 
gram to Sell 5 percent of Public Lands, PUBLIC LAND NEWS, Feb. 18, 1982, at 2. 
31. See generally, WALD & YASSA, supra note 29. 
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counted - in the budget process for purposes of deficit reduc-
tion, in recognition of the fact that liquidation of national as-
sets was not a sound or appropriate way to reduce the deficit.32 
The 104th Congress, however, departed radically from this 
prior practice early in its first session. 
The House and Senate Budget Resolutions, passed in May 
1995, authorized the sale of federal "assets" - national parks, 
national wildlife refuges, national forests and rangelands and 
any other federal properties - in order to generate income to 
balance the budget.33 This "asset sale rule" would have allowed 
Congress to sell the nation's lands to private commercial inter-
ests under the pretext of budget cutting. 
Parks were not exempted from this new approach to bal-
ancing the budget. Indeed, the Fiscal Year 1996 budget envi-
sioned by the Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee called 
for selling the Presidio outright over a period of three years?4 
Proponents of selling the Presidio and other federal lands 
argued that the nation could not afford to maintain all of our 
parks and especially not those that were allegedly of only local 
or regional significance, rather than national importance. 
With its budget of $25 million, the Presidio was - and is - the 
most expensive of all parks in the system.35 Accordingly, it was 
a natural focus of their attack. 
B. GMNG THE PUBLIC LANDS AWAY: TRANSFER, CLOSURE, AND 
COMMERCIALIZATION 
In addition to promoting the sale of federal lands, the anti-
federal land forces in the 104th Congress also promoted an out-
right - and massive - giveaway of these lands to the states. 
The giveaway plan was originally hatched by the Heritage 
32. See W ALD & YASSA, supra note 29, at 4. 
33. See S. CON. RES. 13, 104th Congo (1995); H.R. Con. Res. 67, 104th Congo 
(1995). 
34. See STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, 104th Cong., FY 1996 
BALANCED BUDGET RESOLUTION CHAIRMAN'S MARK (1995). 
35. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-234, at 7, 13 (1995). ("The greatest concern of the 
[House Resources) Committee has been the cost of the Presidio."). 
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Foundation, a conservative think tank, which recommended 
that the Congress "begin a five to seven year effort to give most 
of the land controlled by" the federal government to individual 
states.36 To facilitate this shift, the Foundation recommended 
that the National Park Service, U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of 
Land Management, and Fish and Wildlife Service be drasti-
cally downsized and merged into a single Bureau of Natural 
Resources, and that the federal government then transfer 
"most of the land controlled by this [new] agency back [sic]37 to 
the states. n3B 
Under the Heritage Foundation proposal, only a few select 
parks and wilderness areas would be kept by the federal gov-
ernment - that is, the "parks and wilderness areas deemed of 
national significancen39 - although they never specified what 
that term meant or who would decide which parks and wilder-
nesses qualified for retention. All other lands would be given 
to the states along with "full authority to manage the resources 
according to the values of the citizens of each state''"'o - includ-
ing, presumably, the authority to privatize those resources - in 
other words, to sell them to commercial interests. 
Although several bills were introduced to give entire land 
systems to the states in which they were located,41 no bill tar-
geted the entire park system for outright transfer - perhaps 
because even the most radical opponents of federal lands in 
Congress understood how politically explosive such a proposal 
3S. THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, A STRATEGY TO CUT INTERIOR AND RELATED 
AGENCY SPENDING, A SPECIAL REPORT TO THE APPROPRIATION COMMITTEES 4 (1995) 
!hereinafter "HERITAGE FOUNDATION, A STRATEGY"]. 
37. Contrary to the rhetoric of many in and out of Congress, we cannot give the 
public lands "back" to the states, because the overwhelming majority of them, including 
those in the West, never belonged to the states in the first place. Rather, the federal 
government acting on behalf of all citizens, present and future, acquired the federal 
public lands through treaty, conquest or purchase. See WALD & YASSA, supra note 29, 
at 5, n. 14. 
38. HERITAGE FOUNDATION, A STRATEGY, supra note 36, at 4. 
39. [d. 
40. [d. 
41. See, e.g., S. 1031, 104th Cong., (1995), and its companion in the House, H.R. 
2032, 104th Cong., (1995), which would have given to the states all lands and minerals 
under the jurisdiction of the Interior Department's Bureau of Land Management -
some 268 million acres located principally in the 11 western states and Alaska. 
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would be. One bill was introduced, however, to give the ad-
ministration of all of the national parks in South Dakota to 
that state. 
Based on a proposal by Governor Bill Janklow, Senate Bill 
1185, the South Dakota National Parks Preservation Act, 
would have allowed South Dakota to be given the responsibility 
for maintaining, operating, and administering all national park 
units within its borders.42 Janklow used the specter of closing 
parks due to lack of funding to suggest that the state was in 
the position of doing a better job.43 In return for having its 
state bureaucracy manage the national parks, South Dakota 
would receive those parks' regular federal appropriation.44 
South Dakota, whose state parks are managed with the goal of 
catalyzing development of its tourism economy, indicated it 
would manage national park resources the same way.45 In ad-
dition, the state would be able to establish user fees to further 
offset costS.46 On the whole, the bill sought to allow South Da-
kota to exploit national park resources for commercial gain, 
while ensuring it would receive a subsidy for the effort.47 
There was in fact no need for the enactment of such a bill: 
the National Park Service was not planning to close down any 
parks due to lack of funding. Even more importantly, the bill 
was fundamentally incompatible with the principal reason why 
we have a National Park Service - i.e., to ensure uniform and 
consistent protection and preservation of our natural and cul-
tural heritage. To apportion this responsibility among individ-
42. See S. 1185, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(b) (1995). 
43. See Statement of Lori M. Nelson, Heartland Regional Director, The National 
Parks and Conservation Association, on Governor Janklow's South Dakota Proposal to 
Manage South Dakota's National Parks. September 17. 1995. at 2-3 [hereinafter 
"NPCA Statement on South Dakota Proposal"J. 
44. See S. 1185. 104th Cong .• § 2(e) (1995). 
45. See NPCA Statement on South Dakota Proposal. supra note 43. at 4. 
46. See S. 1185. 104th Cong .• 1st Sess .• § 2(0 (1995). 
47. In fact. as state and county governments are typically cash-poor. any transfers 
of management responsibilities for. or of title to, federal park or other lands would need 
to be accompanied by significant federal payments for operations and maintenance or 
the result would be park liquidation and/or commercialization. Indeed, during the flrst 
session of the 104th Congress. the California Department of Parks and Recreation was 
engaged in its own attempt. known as the Phoenix Plan, to transfer some state parks 
to city and county governments due to its lack of funds. 
11
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ual states would not only require tremendous duplication of 
effort, it would also undermine the preservation mandate nec-
essary to protect these treasures. 
In addition to attempting to transfer large amounts of park 
lands out of the federal estate, park opponents in the 104th 
Congress tried very hard to close down those that they deemed 
"unnecessary" and "undeserving." 
Representatives Jim Hansen (R-UT), Joel Hefley (R-CO), 
and Don Young (R-AK) were among the members of the 104th 
Congress who championed a bill to create a Park Closure 
Commission patterned after the military base closure com mis-
sion.48 Their bill, House Bill 260, contemplated a wholesale 
reorganization of the National Park System.49 A "National 
Park System Review Commission" would be established, with 
the mission of identifying national parks for possible closure 
and transfer to other authorities or for sale to the private sec-
tor. Members of the Commission would be appointed by the 
majority party of the House and Senate.50 In addition, the bill 
exempted the park closure review process from the National 
Environmental Policy Act and specifically from the require-
ment that an environmental impact statement be prepared in 
. connection with the selection of parks to be closed51 - thereby 
denying members of the public the opportunity to participate in 
the process. 
The views of House Bill 260's supporters are illustrative of 
congressional anti-public land, anti-park attitudes. Represen-
tative Young has attacked national parks and wilderness areas 
for "locking up" valuable economic resources and has stated his 
belief that our national parks would be better managed by pri-
vate contractors.52 Representative Hansen has stated: "The 
48. See WALD& YASSA, supra note 29, at 8. 
49. See id. See also letter from Congressman James V. Hansen to "Dear Utah 
Citizens" (December 8, 1994). 
50. See H.R. 260, 104th Cong., § 103(a), (b) (1995). 
51. See id. at § 104. 
52. See, e.g., letter from Congressman Don Young to "Dear Colleague" (March 14, 
1995). 
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question is not whether to close [national] parks, but how to 
accomplish this goal. ... ..53 On another occasion, Mr. Hansen 
opined that "[o]ne hundred and fifty parks of the some 368 
need to be dropped . ..54 Representative Hefley, talking about 
House Bill 260, said: "None of the real parks - the legitimate 
parks are - are going away. But do we need a New Orleans 
Jazz Park? Some of those silly parks just don't make sense.'165 
Representative John Doolittle (R-CA) has stated, "We should 
vastly shrink the size of Redwood National Park, transfer some 
to the county and sell the rest of it.'166 
Moreover, a bill that clearly sought to commercialize the na-
tional parks, House Bill 3819/Senate Bill 1703, was introduced 
late in the 104th Congress. This legislative proposal would 
have allowed the sale of corporate "sponsorships" of the park 
system. Supporters claimed that its passage would provide 
much needed funds for the nation's parks. Opponents pointed 
out that, at best, the bill would have raised less than three per-
cent of estimated unmet park needs while tarnishing the fun-
damental idea of the National Park System.57 In addition, it 
would have created an unavoidable conflict of interest on the 
part of Interior Secretaries that would compromise their ability 
to protect public lands in the future: the bill would have made 
them dependent on corporate sponsors for funds even as they 
were responsible for exercising broad regulatory authority over 
the activities of the same corporations on public lands.58 
Lastly, opponents feared that, in addition to providing little 
actual additional financing, the legislation could well have led 
53. THE AMICUS JOURNAL, Spring 1997, at 3 (an NRDC publication). 
54. Don Bowman, ESA Rewrite Dominated Western States Summit, ELKO DAILY 
FREE PRESS, July 31, 1995. 
55. __ , __ , DENVER POST, Feb. 13, 1995, at _. 
56. Frank Clifford & Mark Lacey, Alaska Legislator Pushes to Loosen U.S. Grip on 
Lands, LA TIMES, Mar. 18, 1995, at p.Al. 
57. See NATIONAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, THE FINAL AssAULT: EN· 
VIRONMENTAL ATTACKS ON THE OMNIBUS PARKS BILL 13 (September 1996) [hereinafter 
"NRDC, THE FINAL AssAULT"J. Supporters predicted the bill would raise $100 million. 
At that time, estimated park needs were estimated to total $4 billion. Since then, that 
estimate has been significantly increased. See, e.g., BUCCINO, supra note 2, at 12-14. 
58. See NRDC, THE FINAL AssAULT, supra note 57, at 13. 
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to future Congresses offsetting the funds raised through spon-
sorship sales by decreases in appropriations.59 
Attempts were made to add Senate Bill 1703 to the Omni-
bus Parks Bill, and for a while, its inclusion - along with a 
number of other environmentally destructive proposals -
threatened to bring the whole parks bill down.60 
C. TYING AGENCY HANDS 
The 104th Congress tried repeatedly and in different ways 
to tie the hands of federal land managers, particularly employ-
ees of the National Park Service, the U.S. Forest Service and 
the Bureau of Land Management, so that they could not man-
age the lands entrusted to them in an environmentally respon-
sible manner. When it came to the Park Service, Congress' fa-
vorite way of accomplishing this goal was by wielding its 
budget ax. 
The 104th Congress' original budget proposal contemplated 
drastic cuts in the Park Service's budget. The Interior De-
partment estimated that the cuts proposed for Fiscal Year 1996 
would have amounted to a thirty-six percent reduction in the 
National Park Service's budget over five years61 and would 
have necessitated closure of numerous historic sites and sev-
eral urban parks as well as the curtailment of visitor services 
and resource protection efforts in large Western wilderness 
parks.62 
At the same time, and only a year after the creation of what 
was then the nation's newest park, Mojave National Preserve, 
59. See id., pointing out that this had been congressional practice in the past un-
der analogous circumstances. 
60. See id. at 2-5. Previously, anti-wilderness forces in the 104th Congress had 
sought to secure the passage of a controversial Utah wilderness bill by attaching to it 
the Presidio Trust bill and the Sterling Forest bill. See Editorial, Free the Presidio! 
Delink From Utah, S.F. CHRONICLE, March 29, 1996, at p. A22; Editorial, The Orrin 
Hatch Land Grab, N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 1996, at p. _. 
61. See DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, NEWS RELEASE, STATEMENT OF INTERIOR 
SECRETARY BRUCE BABBITT RE: THE HOUSE BUDGET RESOLUTION (May 24, 1995). 
62. See id. 
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opponents tried to use the budget process to close it.63 On June 
27, 1995, the House Appropriations Committee approved the 
Fiscal Year 1996 Interior Appropriations bill with language 
that would have prevented the National Park Service from 
managing the Preserve, by transferring management funds 
and personnel from the Park Service to the Bureau of Land 
Management ("BLM"), with instructions to manage the area 
under BLM standards, not Park standards.64 
Although both of these attempts ultimately failed, it was not 
before the 104th Congress literally shut down the nation's 
parks along with other federal offices and programs in a highly 
publicized battle with the President over budget issues. At the 
height of that battle, the National Park System was closed for 
the first time in its eighty-year history, from December 16, 
1995, to January 5, 1996.65 In all, 367 parks were closed - all 
but two of the 369 units that then comprised the System.66 
Only 2,500 of the Park Service's 20,000 employees remained on 
duty, more than 383,000 visitors were turned away from parks 
each day of the twenty-one-day shutdown at a daily cost to the 
U.S. Treasury of $104,000 in entrance fees, and local communi-
ties lost nearly $14.2 million.67 
63. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, THE YEAR OF LIVING 
DANGEROUSLY: CONGRESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN 1995 at 17 (1995). 
64. See, e.g., NATIONAL PARKS AND CONSERVATION AsSOCIATION, FACT SHEET: 
WAR ON THE NATIONAL PARKS IN THE 104TH CONGRESS 1 (1995). The BLM manages 
the federal lands under its jurisdiction, some 270 million acres, pursuant to the princi-
ples of multiple use and sustained yield. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(8), 1702(c), 1712(c) (1986). AB a result, virtually all non-
consumptive and economic uses, including livestock grazing, mineral production, and 
timber harvesting, are permitted on BLM-managed lands, along with recreational and 
non-economic activities. The National Park Service, in contrast, is charged with pro-
tecting parks from significant degradation so that future as well as present generations 
can enjoy them. See National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). See also 
BUCCINO, supra note 2, at 2. Typically, consumptive and commodity uses are not al-
lowed in parks, while hiking, camping and other recreational activities are. 
65. See U.S. Department of the Interior, Shutcrown Closes National Park System, 
3 PEOPLE LAND & WATER 14 (February 1996). Under agreements with the States of 
Arizona and New Mexico, the south rim of Grand Canyon National Park and Carlsbad 
Caverns National Park stayed open during the shutdown and limited services were 
provided. See id. 
66. See id. 
67. See id. See also NATIONAL PARKS CONSERVATION AssOCIATION, THE 
ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL PARKS: EFFECTS OF THE 1995-1996 GoVERNMENT 
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IV. THE PRESIDIO LEGISLATION: ITS WEAKNESSES 
AND ITS STRENGTHS 
The anti-park agenda of members of the l04th Congress 
was conspicuous during the debates over the future of the Pre-
sidio and is reflected in the actual legislation establishing the 
Presidio Trust. 
In its final form, the Presidio Trust legislation includes fea-
tures which exemplify both the l04th Congress' attacks on 
parks and public lands and the resultant public outcry which 
prevented passage of those aggressive, draconian bills. While 
legislation which attempted to close parks or slash their fund-
ing represented a relatively easy target to organize against, 
even in the l04th Congress, the complexity of the Presidio's 
management needs, as well as that of the legislation crafted to 
address them, posed a far more difficult problem for the Park's 
advocates. 
A. THE PRESIDIO REGIME IS FLAWED 
The Presidio Trust legislation created a new management 
entity designed and established to manage the rehabilitation, 
restoration, and leasing of the park's historic properties. The 
Trust, which is managed by a seven member board composed of 
experts in the fields of finance, property management, conser-
vation, and business,68 is responsible for the development and 
implementation of a program to rent and manage the Presidio's 
now-vacant buildings.69 To carry out this responsibility, the 
Trust has been granted broad authority to hire staff, negotiate 
contracts, and enter into joint powers agreements.70 It is also 
empowered to guarantee loans and issue obligations to the Sec-
retary of the Treasury.71 
SHUTDOWNS ON SELECTED PARK-DEPENDENT BUSINESSES AND COMMUNITIES (1996) 
!hereinafter "NPCA, THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL PARKS"J. 
68. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 103(cXIXA)-(B) (1996). 
69. See 16 U.S.C. § 104(a). 
70. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 103(cX7), 104(b). 
71. See 16 U.S.C. § 104(d). 
16
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol28/iss3/5
1998] PRESIDIO TRUST AND NATIONAL PARKS 385 
Structured as "a wholly owned government corporation,"'2 
the Trust and its board are independent of the Interior De-
partment and the Executive Branch,73 and subject to minimal 
public scrutiny.74 Instead, Congress made the Trust subject to 
its authority and oversight. Accountability is to be achieved 
through annual reports and goal statements that are to be de-
livered to the House Committee on Resources and the Senate 
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.75 Further, Con-
gress directed the General Accounting Office to study and re-
port on the Trust's progress in meeting the obligations outlined 
in the law and established a schedule for publication of the re-
quired reports.76 These reports are to be addressed to the Sen-
ate Committees on Energy and Natural Resources and on Ap-
propriations as well as to the Resources and Appropriations 
Committees of the House of Representatives.77 
Although these provisions are problematic,78 they are not 
the most problematic provisions of the legislation. That dis-
tinction goes to still other provisions of the law - those that 
deal with funding the park and the so-called "reversion clause." 
72. See 16 U.S.C. § 103(cX10). 
73. Under the original version of the Presidio legislation, the Trust was under the 
jurisdiction of the Interior Department. In explaining why the Trust "would be an 
independent government corporation," the Report on the House bill from the Commit-
tee on Resources, stated that "[tlhe Committee is convinced that separation of the 
Trust from the Interior Department will result in an overall cost-savings to the gov-
ernment and increase the fmancial viability of the Trust." H.R. REP. No. 104-234, at 9 
(1995). 
74. The Trust is required to hold only two open public meetings per year. See 16 
U.S.C. § 103(cX6) (1996). In addition, it is not required to provide infonnation directly 
to members of the public or to receive comments directly from the public. See id. 
Rather, it is authorized to deal with the public "through the Golden Gate National 
Recreation Area Advisory Commission," id., and it decided to do so at its first public 
meeting. 
75. See 16 U.S.C. § 103(cX10XB) (1996). 
76. See 16 U.S.C. § 106. 
77. See id. 
78. For eXl\Illple, supporters of the trust concept strongly urged that the Presidio 
Trust be under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior to ensure account-
ability as well as to maximize public involvement in its decision-making. See, e.g., 
letter from Johanna H. Wald and Ann Notthoff, National Resources Defense Council, to 
the Honorable Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, Subcommittee on Parks, Historic 
Preservation and Recreation (Dec. 6, 1995) (on me in NRDC's San Francisco office). 
17
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In enacting the Presidio Trust legislation, Congress found 
that the Trust is the vehicle by which the Presidio "will be 
managed through an innovative public/private partnership 
that minimizes cost to the United States Treasury and makes 
efficient use of private sector resources."79 With this seventh, 
and last, finding of the Trust bill, Congress laid the foundation 
for the most far-reaching and unprecedented features of this 
far-from-ordinary national park legislation. 
The anti-park forces in Congress were pulled up short in 
their effort to cut spending on parks. However, if they could 
not spend any less on parks, they certainly were not going to 
spend any more - and especially not in California, which had 
recently benefited from the California Desert Protection Act. 
The cost of maintaining the Presidio was, first and last, the 
largest hurdle the park and its supporters had to overcome. No 
matter that the Sixth Army spent over $70 million per year 
during its occupation of the Presidio.8o The National Park 
Service's bare bones budget of $25 million was simply unac-
ceptable.81 To ensure that far less than that amount would be 
spent on the Presidio, Congress imposed real restrictions on 
future appropriations in the Trust legislation. 
Specifically, the law requires that, following submittal of a 
fifteen-year business plan to Congress, appropriations to the 
Trust will be restricted to the amounts specified in the plan.82 
In addition, the law also requires the business plan to "in-
clude[ ] a schedule of annual decreasing federally appropriated 
funding ... .',sa Finally, the law specifies that, following the 
fifteenth year of its existence, the Trust will receive no further 
appropriations.84 Not only must the Trust "minimize cost to 
79. 16 U.S.C. § 101(7). 
80. See FEDERAL BUDGET, FY 1993. 
81. The House Resources Committee referred to the $25 million cost as "unrealis-
tic" and expressed the view that "development of a reasonable [fiscal) program [for the 
Park) is essential." H.R. REP. No. 104-234, at 11 (1995). 
82. See 16 U.S.C. § 105(a)(2)(1994). The business plan must be submitted to Con-
gress one year after the Trust's first meeting. See 16 U.S.C. § 105(b) (1994). 
83. Id. 
84. See id. 
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the United States Treasury," but also, after fifteen years, it 
cannot be a burden at all. 
By these restrictions, the 104th Congress, thwarted in its 
attempt to unencumber the Treasury from the responsibility of 
supporting our national parks, adroitly shifted responsibility 
for the Presidio to a new governmental entity. Although they 
were unable to give it to an established governmental entity 
such as the City of San Francisco, they created a new one and 
gave it a wholly new mandate - that it "achieve, at a minimum, 
self-sufficiency ... within 15 ... years."a5 
The 104th Congress also specified what was to happen in 
the event that the Trust failed to attain self-sufficiency within 
the required time period, notwithstanding the gradual reduc-
tion in appropriations, the cutting off of all funds after fifteen 
years, and the diligent scrutiny of Congress. The obvious out-
come in this event - at least in past Congresses --:- would have 
been to return its governance to the National Park Service. 
The 104th Congress, however, refused to entertain this option 
for the Presidio: not only was it unwilling to appropriate funds 
for the management of "ordinary" park units, it did. not believe 
that the Park Service was capable of dealing with the unique 
management problems posed by this far-from-ordinary park.86 
Congress had, after all, removed the Trust and the lands it 
would administer from the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the 
Interior. If the Trust, which was specifically designed to ad-
dress the situation at the Presidio, was not up to the task, then 
Congress was certainly not going to give the Park Service the 
chance to try. 
Instead, Congress provided a simple and unequivocal direc-
tive in the event that the Trust failed to meet its mandate: Sell 
the Presidio. The legislation's controversial "reversion" clause 
provides that, if the Trust fails after fifteen years to meet its 
obligations, all properties under its jurisdiction "shall be trans-
ferred" to the General Services Administration for disposal in 
accordance with the provisions of the Defense Authorization 
85. [d. 
86. See H.R. REP. No. 104-234, at 10 (1995). 
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Act of 1990, which in tum provide for sale or transfer out of 
federal ownership.87 The legislation goes on to specify that 
"any real property so transferred [shall] be deleted from the 
Golden Gate National Recreation Area.',ss 
B. THE PRESIDIO LEGISLATION COULD HAVE BEEN WORSE 
The anti-park forces in the 104th Congress were nothing if 
not persistent. Frustrated at not moving a single item on their 
agenda, they clearly extracted a high price for passage of what 
was to be the only park bill enacted during that session. For-
tunately for the Presidio, they were not the only persistent 
legislators working the bill. Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-
San Francisco) proved to be a worthy adversary in this test of 
wills. 
For every damaging provision that anti-park legislators de-
manded, Representative Pelosi made sure that language pro-
viding protection for the Park was also in place, starting with 
the findings themselves. In this section, Congress was forced 
to acknowledge the tremendous significance of the Presidio's 
resources calling it "one of America's great natural and historic 
sites."s9 The Presidio's inclusion within the boundary of Golden 
Gate National Recreation Area was preserved.90 Moreover, the 
legislation requires that park resources be managed in such a 
way as to "protect[ ] the Presidio from development and uses 
which would destroy the scenic beauty and historic and natural 
character of the area and cultural and recreational 
resources. ,,91 
Despite the removal of the Trust from the jurisdiction of the 
Interior Department, Representative Pelosi assured it would 
have a close relationship with the Park Service and the Secre-
tary of the Interior. First, as indicated above, the law requires 
that the Secretary of the Interior, or his or her designee, be a 
87. See 16 U.S.C. § 104(0). 
88.Id. 
89. 16 U.S.C. § 101(1). 
90. See 16 U.S.C. § 101(5). 
91. Id. 
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member of the Trust Board.92 This and other membership re-
quirements of the Board are intended to help establish strong 
resource protection representation among the individuals re-
sponsible for the Presidio's fate. Second, the law provides that, 
for purposes of carrying out its mandate, the Trust is to be con-
sidered a successor in interest to the Park Service with respect 
to compliance to the National Environmental Policy Act and all 
other environmental laws as well as National Historic Preser-
vation Acts.93 In effect, the Trust must follow all of the same 
statutes that govern the Park Service in its administration of 
other parks and must include the public in its decision making. 
In addition, the Trust must work closely with the Interior De-
partment and the Park Service in a number of key areas. 
The Trust is, for example, required to comply with GGNRA 
park "purposes" and with "the general objectives of the General 
Management Plan" for the Presidio.94 It must consult with the 
Secretary of the Interior in preparing its management program 
as well as in developing its rules and regulations.95 The Trust, 
too, is responsible for cooperating with the Park Service to as-
sure visitor access, interpretation and educational programs in 
lands it administers.96 Finally, Representative Pelosi sought to 
protect the lands that were not specifically related to real es-
tate management, but were nonetheless administratively 
transferred to the Trust - i.e. open space lands and the Presi-
dio's historic forest. 
Specifically, the law requires the Trust to maintain at least 
the current amount of open space at the Presidio and prohibits 
it from disposing of or conveying fee title to any real property 
under its administration.97 Additionally, the Trust is encour-
aged to transfer administration back to the Secretary of the 
Interior, of any lands which are not needed by it and which 
have high public use potentia1.98 In its original form, the Trust 
92. See 16 U.S.C. § 103(eX1XA). 
93. See 16 U.S.C. § 104(e). 
94. 16 U.S.C. § 104(a). 
95. See 16 U.S.C. § 104(e), (j). 
96. See 16 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
97. See 16 U.S.C. § 104(b). 
98. See 16 U.S.C. § 105(b). 
21
Wald: Presidio Trust and National Parks
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1998
390 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vo1.28:369 
legislation provided only for transfer of buildings to the trust, 
as these were the marketable resource. The 104th Congress, 
however, sought - and obtained - a much larger transfer.99 It 
seems likely that, as open space has little rental value and re-
quires management, the Trust will move quickly to place these 
lands back under the jurisdiction of the agency that clearly can 
protect and manage them. 
These provisions, however, cannot and do not transform the 
Presidio Trust legislation into a traditional park bill. It is pat-
ently the product of the 104th Congress. Its features repre-
sented the very best the anti-park forces could achieve in the 
face of the backlash their own over-reaching created. Although 
they could not sell the Presidio or give it away or deny it the 
funds needed for its management, they could and did give 
management of its historic buildings to a wholly new govern-
ment entity, responsible to them and not to the Interior De-
partment. In addition, they could and did require the Trust to 
achieve self-sufficiency within flfteen years, during which time 
appropriations would decline. And, last but by no means least, 
they could and did require that, if the goal of self-sufficiency is 
not met, the Park's lands be put on the block. 
While it yet remains to be seen whether that draconian re-
sult will occur, even if the Trust does not achieve this goal, 
there is no question but that these provisions are unprece-
dented. No other park in the entire system is subject to even 
one of these requirements, let alone all of them - and none, in-
cluding the Presidio, should be. 
99. AB the House Report noted, the legislation transferred "administrative juris-
diction over about 80 percent of the lands at the Presdidio from the Secretary to the 
Trust". Although the area for which the Trust would be responsible "includes essen-
tially all of the leasable building space," it is more than "just buildings." H.R. REP. No. 
104-234, at 9 (1995). 
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V. WHY THE PRESIDIO TRUST MODEL IS NOT 
APPROPRIATE FOR OTHER PARKS 
A. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OUR NATIONAL PARKS 
For Fiscal Year 1997, the Park Service's budget amounted 
to $1.4 billion, with which it had to maintain 375 parks and 
serve an estimated 276 million visitors.1oo Overall, the vast 
majority of the Service's budget comes from appropriated 
funds. 101 Although a small amount of revenue is generated 
through park entrance and permit fees, these funds only cover 
the costs associated with collecting those fees with the remain-
der going to the Treasury.I02 Although $1.4 billion sounds like 
a large amount and, in point of fact, is more than the other 
land management agencies receive, in constant dollars, the 
Park Service's budget declined by $635 million from 1978 to 
1996.103 At the same time, seventy-nine new parks have been 
created and the number of annual visitors has increased by 
almost 40 million.I04 
Although $1.4 billion sounds like a lot, we spend a lot more 
on other programs than we do on our parks. For example, we 
spend $3.2 billion on the federal prison system and $22.3 bil-
lion on highway construction. We spend as much to subsidize 
corporate cotton growers as we do on parks.lo5 
For this $1.4 billion, Americans receive a park system that 
is the envy of the rest of the world - and, in fact, many of the 
visitors to our parks come from other countries. What is more, 
there is no better recreation deal in this country than touring 
the National Parks. Even with the recent increase of fees at 
Yellowstone, Yosemite and Grand Teton National Parks to $20 
per week, enjoyment of these unique areas is a bargain com-
100. See BUCCINO, supra note 2, at 17. 
101. See id. 
102. A new fee program has allowed 100 of our most popular National Parks to re-
tain 80% of specified fee increases to address backlogged maintenance projects on a 
three-year experimental basis. See Pub. L. No. 104-134 (1996). 
103. See BUCCINO, supra note 2, at 17. 
104. See id. 
105. See id. at 21. 
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pared to a visit to an amusement park for a day, a professional 
sporting event, or a professional performing arts production. 
Our parks produce real benefits for visitors and others. 
They provide all who visit them with the opportunity to learn 
about how our ancestors lived and how America used to be. We 
cherish our parks because they keep our natural, cultural, and 
ecological history alive. They also provide significant economic 
benefits for those who work in them or whose businesses de-
pend on them.106 These myriad benefits are the reason why 
past Congresses - including even the 104th Congress - have 
seen fit to create new parks again and again since 1872, even 
as opponents claim that we have too many or they cost too 
much. 
B. WHAT IF OTHER PARKS WERE REQUIRED TO BE 
SELF-SUFFICIENT? 
Many of those who oppose our national parks claim that 
they should be self-sufficient - that each park should raise the 
funds needed for its operation or else face being shut down. 
They strongly advocate "relying on park visitors, not Congress, 
for operating support" for all of our parks,I°7 regardless of the 
sums involved, the resources preserved, and questions of equity 
or access by the poor. IOB Many advocates of self-sufficiency are 
likely to support the notion of exploiting park resources as a 
means of supporting park operations. As such, they can be ex-
pected to point to the Trust legislation as a model for other 
parks. 
106. According to the National Park Service, the national parks generate roughly 
$10 billion a year in their surrounding economies. The Interior Department has esti-
mated that communities surrounding the parks lost $14 million in tourism sales every 
day that the parks were closed during the winter of 1995-96. NPCA, THE ECONOMIC 
IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL PARKS, supra note 67, at Preface. 
107. See, e.g., DONALD R. LEAL & HOLLY LIPPKE FRETWELL, BACK TO THE FuTuRE 
TO SAVE OUR PARKS (PERC Policy Series, Issue Number PS-10) (June 1997). 
108. Polls indicate that people would be willing to pay more than they do now to 
visit parks, but would oppose efforts to raise fees on an across-the-board basis as well 
as at parks used heavily by those with limited means. See, e.g., AMERICAN VIEWS ON 
NATIONAL PARK ISSUES, A SUMMARY REPORT BY THE NATIONAL PARKS & CONSER-
VATION ASSocIATION AND HUMAN DIMENSIONS IN NATIONAL RESOURCES UNIT, 
COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY (May 21, 1996). 
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As noted earlier, the Presidio's historic buildings are unique 
in that their preservation requires their use. That use can 
generate funds which directly benefit the resource. Moreover, 
because the Presidio has so many buildings and is so well situ-
ated, it is at least conceivable that rental income will suffice to 
cover management needs. The same cannot be said about the 
resources in other units of the National Park System. In other 
.parks, using resources to generate operating funds would di-
rectly harm those resources and the parks within which they 
are located; it would also degrade the visitor experience. What 
is more, it is by no means clear that making use of the re-
sources of these parks would generate significant sums of 
money, let alone the amounts that are needed. 
First of all, many of the resources protected by our parks 
are not renewable. Take for example the geologic formations in 
Utah's Arches National Park. Once those formations are gone, 
they are gone forever. They cannot be recreated. "Using" such 
resources to generate operating funds would be inconsistent 
with the preservation ideal that is the fundamental premise of 
our national parks. 
Some may argue that certain resources, while not renew-
able, are not even seen by visitors and should, therefore, be 
utilized. Gold and other minerals come to mind - along with 
images of the destruction that would result from an open pit 
gold mine in the heart of Mojave National Preserve, images 
that include piles of ore soaked in cyanide rising above the des-
ert landscape along with the mountains of waste rock. Such a 
mine would not only be seen, it would also be heard. It would 
ruin the natural quiet of the Preserve and would forever alter 
its natural landscape. 
The huge public outcry that arose at home and abroad when 
a massive gold mine was proposed just outside the border of 
Yellowstone National Park is evidence of just how controversial 
such a project would be. In addition, because such mines are 
governed by the Mining Law of 1872, they would generate nei-
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ther rents nor royalties for the federal government - so would 
contribute nothing to operating costs ofthe parks.109 
Then there are the resources which have the capacity to re-
generate on their own. The giant redwoods of California's 
Redwood State and National Parks are a good example. A sal-
vage logging operation following a major storm or wildfire 
might seem to be a reasonable way to reap tremendous profits 
for the park which could then be used for other park protection 
projects. At least one state park - Custer State Park in South 
Dakota - allows timber harvesting to obtain operating fundsllo 
and has been hailed as a model for federal parks to emulate.l11 
Yet the construction of logging roads, the impacts to endan-
gered species, and the degradation of watersheds and rivers 
that would result make this, too, an untenable option for park 
funding. 
Similarly, grazing exists in a number of park units, a ves-
tige of our "traditional use" of public lands.ll2 What would be 
the response to proposals for the return of domestic sheep to 
Yosemite's alpine meadows, or the elimination of bison within 
Yellowstone's borders to make way for the introduction of pri-
vately-owned cows? Already restive over the environmental 
109. Exploration for, and development of, gold, silver, copper and other so-called 
"hard rock" minerals on federal lands is governed by the Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. 
§ 22 et seq. (1994). Under this law, any business or citizen can locate a claim on up to 
20 acres of non-withdrawn or "open" public lands. See, e.g., COMMI'ITEE ON NATURAL 
RESOURCES, MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, SUBCOMMI'ITEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVES-
TIGATIONS, TAKING FROM THE TAXPAYER: PuBLIC SUBSIDIES FOR NATURAL RESOURCE 
DEVELOPMENT at 14 (August 1994) (hereinafter "COMMI'ITEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES, 
TAKING FROM THE TAXPAYER"). It has been estimated that, overall, the National Park 
System contains over two thousand mining claims. See Todd Wilkinson, Undermining 
the Parks, NATIONAL PARKS, Jan.IFeb. 1991, at 29. Minerals that are extracted from 
these claims are extracted free of charge. See COMMI'ITEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES, 
TAKING FROM THE TAXPAYER, supra, at 15. 
110. See NPCA Statement on South Dakota Proposal, supra note 43. 
111. See LEAL & FRETWELL, supra note 107, at 26-29. The authors, however, do not 
acknowledge that logging takes place in this park - or perhaps they do not know. 
112. Currently livestock grazing is occurring in units such as Great Basin, Channel 
Islands, Gettysburg and Death Valley National Parks as well as in Point Reyes Na-
tional Seashore and Mojave National Preserve. Grazing impacts on the Channel Is-
lands have resulted in the listing of several endangered plant taxa, the imposition of a 
Clean up or Abatement Order for violations of the Clean Water Act, and a lawsuit by 
the National Parks and Conservation Association. 
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impacts of grazing in other parks and other federal lands, the· 
public ·would find expansion of this activity in our national 
parks abhorrent. What is more, because federal grazing too is 
traditionally subsidized through, for example, imposition of 
below-cost, below-market grazing fees,113 this use would be ex-
tremely unlikely to generate much in the way of funds. 
To follow this line of reasoning to its extreme, we return to 
the Presidio. If buildings are the only reasonable means by 
which we can extract money from our national parks, why 
should we not build more of them? Historically, a swank de-
velopment was planned for the Limantour Beach area of Point 
Reyes National Seashore. The plans for that subdivision still 
exist in a Park Service archive. Long-term leases of the houses 
of such a development could generate enough revenue to pro-
vide for the administration of Point Reyes and number of 
smaller parks. 
But now we have come full circle. That proposed develop-
ment was precisely the reason Congress chose to protect this 
unparalleled natural area in the first place. 
The fact is our national parks have been set aside because 
they are worthy of preservation for present and future genera-
tions - and that is the mandate the Park Service has been 
given for their management.114 To require them to earn their 
operating funds would necessarily mean the Park Service 
would have to stop managing for the long term and begin in-
stead to look for short term resource management strategies 
that would maximize return - an approach that is fundamen-
tally inconsistent with long term resource preservation. Parks 
benefit the nation - and the nation, through the U.S. Treasury, 
should provide for their operational needs. 
Indeed, rather than continue to insist that the Presidio be-
come self-sustaining or else, the legislation that established the 
Trust should be amended to ensure that this extraordinary site 
113. See FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, ET AL., GREEN SCISSORS 1997 - CUTTING 
WASTEFUL AND ENVIRONMENTALLY HARMFUL SPENDING AND SUBSIDIES 25 (1997). 
114. See 1916 Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). 
27
Wald: Presidio Trust and National Parks
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1998
396 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.28:369 
with its remarkable resources will be protected and preserved 
for future generations to enjoy and appreciate. 
VI. HOW THE PRESIDIO TRUST LEGISLATION SHOULD 
BE CHANGED 
By now it should be clear why the Presidio Trust legislation 
should be changed. The law takes unprecedented steps to re-
move the Presidio from National Park Service jurisdiction, 
limits, and eventually eliminates, appropriations to the park, 
and directs sale of the property should the Trust fail to achieve 
self-sufficiency by the specified date. Moreover, due to the po-
litical dynamics which created the legislation, we can assume 
that efforts will be made to apply this approach to other units 
of the National Park System. But, just as the l04th Congress 
found it could not muster support for sweeping change, propo-
nents of an improved Presidio Trust should not expect whole-
sale change overnight. 
In the near term, the language regulating the Trust is a 
danger to the preservation of the Presidio. In the long term, it 
has the potential to undermine the entire park system. Given 
congressional politics, prioritizing action to avert these threats 
is not only the logical strategy, it is essential. 
The single greatest immediate threat to the Presidio's re-
sources is the requirement that Trust operate self-sufficiently 
within fifteen years and the penalty if it does not. These two 
inextricably-linked provisions hang like the sword of Damocles 
over the Trust, and will necessarily influence its management 
decisions. For example, faced with the threat of sale, the Trust 
will be forced to seek out tenants who are able to pay t~e high-
est rents and have the flexibility to move quickly when leases 
are let. Disadvantageq in this scenario, or one could say dis-
criminated against, will be nonprofit organizations and small 
businesses dedicated to finding solutions to environmental 
problems and creating sustainable economies. 
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Instead of the synergistic, future-oriented community envi-
sioned in the park's General Management Plan,115 the Presi-
dio's buildings may simply be rented to a variety of businesses 
in order to achieve self-sufficiency and avoid sale. 116 Because a 
host of management decisions will be affected by the self-
sufficiency mandate, even if the reversion clause were omitted, 
both features of the current law need to be eliminated. 
As the legislation calls for decreasing appropriations over 
the course of the fifteen years, one could argue that this provi-
sion should be the next to be amended .. Without the reversion 
clause, however, the threat of selling off the Presidio would no 
longer exist. The Trust would then have more latitude to fol-
low the General Management Plan developed by the Park 
Service. While the Trust could potentially receive fewer federal 
dollars to work with, it is far less likely that it would fail out-
right. For this reason, as well as the potential for raising 
money through grants and private donations, the Presidio 
would be better served by an amendment that would bring the 
Trust back under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, than by one which would address appropriations. 
Amending the law to reincorporate the Presidio's real estate 
into the Golden Gate National Recreation Area and place the 
Trust under National Park Service Administration is the next 
step to assuring appropriate use of the historic buildings and 
the protection of the natural areas. The Trust would still have 
the responsibility for real estate management, a task most 
agree is beyond the Park Service's capability. The agency does, 
however, have the expertise as well as the mandate to preserve 
the Presidio's resources and to manage them consistent with 
the General Management Plan as well as to comply with all 
other applicable federal laws. Placing the Trust under the ju-
risdiction of the Park Service is the best way of ensuring that 
115. See NPS, FINAL PRESIDIO GENERAL PLAN AMENDMENT, supra note 10, at v (A 
Vision for the Presidio). 
116. This is not to say that the author believes there is any realistic possibility that 
a high-rise mall will built on Presidio grounds, as some opponents of the legislation 
fear. See, e.g., Angela Alioto, The Presidio Land Grab, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 20, 
1997. 
29
Wald: Presidio Trust and National Parks
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1998
398 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vo1.28:369 
the preservation mandate is met for all resources - both natu-
ral and historic - at the Presidio. 
With these three modifications, restrictions which would ei-
ther result in the loss of the Presidio outright or significantly 
alter the park's mission would be removed. As opportunities 
arise, whether by a change in political leadership or public de-
mand, further amendments could be offered to increase appro-
priations, remove the language mandating a maximum return 
on the real estate, and correct other flaws in the law. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
If the Presidio's vast panoply of cultural and natural re-
sources are what establishes the park as unique among units of 
the National Park System, its management by the Presidio 
Trust only sets it further apart. From the beginning, when the 
Presidio made the transition from post to park, its proximity to 
a large urban area, the cost of its maintenance, and the desir-
ability of its real estate, all conspired to bring attention and 
scrutiny from leaders of the l04th Congress in need of fodder 
for their anti-park agenda. 
In many respects, that Congress successfully manipulated 
the Presidio's uniqueness against ~tself and, ultimately, the 
entire system. Having failed in a wholesale attempt to liqui-
date our national parks, Congress made history by transferring 
the Presidio's management out of the National Park Service-
and future Congresses may well attempt to build on this suc-
cess. 
If history is any guide, the Presidio Trust is likely to be seen 
as a "bold" and "daring" model by many in the Congressional 
debates to come. Therefore, amending the Presidio Trust leg-
islation to bring it more in line with traditional Park Service 
management is imperative. Correcting the anti-park provi-
sions of the law will not only help retain the unique resources 
of the Presidio, it will also help defend the integrity of our en-
tire system of national parks now and in the future. 
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